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**Abstracts**

**Dan Giblin – Dissertation Abstract**

**Digging for Victory: The Stalinist State’s Mobilization of Civilian Labor for the Battle of Kursk**

My dissertation explores the methods the Soviet leadership employed to mobilize the local peasantry to construct a variety of military installations in preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle in human history and, arguably, the turning point of the war against Hitler. Dozens of authors have written on the armies, the weapons, and the fighting in the battle, but none have focused on the tremendous achievement of more than 300,000 civilians, mostly women, who labored under German fire for several months in 1943 to ensure the Red Army a defensive system that would guarantee victory in the final significant German offensive of the war. My dissertation tells the heretofore untold story of how the Kursk Communist Party leadership, three Soviet army groups, and the Moscow political elites coordinated myriad construction projects that were ultimately crucial to the Soviet victory. In so doing I shed light on civil-military relations as well as center-periphery tensions in the Soviet system. More importantly, I illustrate the dynamic relationship between the state and citizenry in wartime.

**Morgan Kaplan – Dissertation Abstract**

**Persuading Power: Insurgent Diplomacy and the International Politics of Rebellion**

My research examines how rebel groups use international diplomacy as a strategic tool to advance their domestic war-time objectives. From the Trent Affair of 1861, to Yasser Arafat’s speech at the United Nations in 1974, to Syrian opposition lobbying today, acts of insurgent diplomacy have defined some of the most memorable and important events in international politics. Yet rebel groups can choose to engage with different types of actors, solicit different types of assistance, and have a diverse set of political-military objectives motivating their diplomatic strategies abroad.

My dissertation therefore asks: What explains variation in the strategies of diplomacy rebel groups employ to solicit third-party support? I argue that how rebel groups approach international politics is directly linked to the domestic balance of power between rebel groups and their enemies, as well as intra-insurgent competitive dynamics. More specifically, variation in rebel diplomatic strategies are a function of: 1) the military viability of a rebel group, which affects the type of intervention rebels seek from outside actors; and 2) the degree of fragmentation within the broader insurgent movement, which affects who rebels solicit such support from.

To test my argument, I conduct an analysis of the Iraqi Kurdish (1958-1990) and Palestinian (1959-1988) national movements. These case studies make use of 62 original interviews with 48 Kurdish and Palestinian officials, as well as primary-source archival work in Erbil, London, Ramallah, and Washington. Importantly, I employ the private archive of a former Kurdish diplomat, providing unparalleled access to correspondence between Kurdish leaders and third-party actors.

**Kaplan - New Faces Presentation Abstract**

**Strategies of Insurgent Diplomacy: Evidence from the Iraqi Kurdish Liberation Movement**

From the Trent Affair of 1861, to Yasser Arafat’s speech at the United Nations in 1974, to Syrian opposition lobbying today, acts of insurgent diplomacy have defined some of the most memorable events in international politics. International diplomacy is a ubiquitous feature of insurgent politics because it is intrinsically linked to how groups pursue third-party political and military support. However, although war-time diplomacy is central to insurgent politics, scholars still cannot explain the substantial variation in insurgent diplomatic strategy**,** or the ways in which diplomacy is employed by groups over time.

This article examines the varying strategies of insurgent diplomacy, and more specifically, when and why rebel groups focus their diplomatic attention on certain international actors over others. I argue that variation in the diplomatic strategies of rebel groups is driven by domestic intra-insurgent dynamics within the conflict zone. More specifically, rebel groups’ targets of diplomacy are a function of the degree of fragmentation within the broader insurgent movement. When an insurgent movement is deeply fragmented, diplomacy is likely to target the central government’s foreign adversaries. However, when an insurgent movement is united, and focused more intently on undermining the central government, groups will seek support from the state’s international allies.

To demonstrate these dynamics, this article looks at shifts in Iraqi Kurdish diplomatic strategy from 1958 to 1990. The analysis makes use of 37 original interviews with 28 current and former Kurdish diplomatic officials in Iraqi Kurdistan, Europe, and the United States, as well as archival documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series and the private archive of a former Kurdish leader and diplomat. Documents from the latter archive include minutes of leadership meetings, letters between Kurdish leaders, and most importantly, external letters between Kurdish leaders and foreign governments, political parties, international and non-governmental organizations, and private individuals.

Michael Kenwick – **Dissertation Abstract**

**Securing Control and Controlling Security: Civil-Military Relations and Conflict Processes**

My Dissertation is comprised of three essays that investigate how civilian elites secure over military and how this dynamic both affects and is affected by civil and interstate conflict.

The first essay examines civilian control as it relates to the military’s ability to stage a coup. While scholars have argued that the norm of subjugation within the military is central to civilian control, few studies have tested this claim. I do so by constructing and validating a measurement model that generates continuous, yearly estimates of civilian control for all countries from 1946 to 2010. I incorporate the presence of norms through a dynamic modeling structure, and find that doing so improves model performance, suggesting norms of subjugation are both self-reinforcing and a critical component of civilian control.

The second essay uses this measure to examine variation in foreign policy within and across regime type. I argue that weak control of the military increases the incentive of political leaders to adopt preventive foreign policy strategies and initiate international disputes. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that that these relationships are strongest for democracies and party-based autocracies, indicating that civilian control is most tightly linked with foreign policy decision-making in regimes where civil-military relations are typically assumed to be strongest.

The third essay reverses this causal arrow to examine how security threats shape civil-military relations. Civilian elites fearing military takeover often engage in coup-proofing strategies, but there is little consensus about whether and when these strategies are effective. I develop a conditional theory of coupproofing effectiveness, arguing that such strategies will be effective when a state is faced with international rivals, but counterproductive when a state is faced with threats from domestic rebels. I find strong empirical evidence for these claims.

**Kenwick - New Faces Presentation Abstract**

**Is Civilian Control Self-Reinforcing? A Measurement Based Analysis of Civil-Military Relations**

Asserting control over the military is a fundamental characteristic of any stable civilian regime.  While scholars have long held that a norm of subjugation within the armed forces is critical to civilian rule, there is little empirical evidence that directly supports this claim.  This is driven, in part, by a dearth of valid cross-sectional measures of civilian control across political regimes. I argue that developing a norm of subjugation depends critically on a shared belief among military elites that coups and interventions into politics are untenable policy options.  These beliefs develop slowly over time and as the result of stable periods of civil-military bargaining.  I test these claims by using latent variable modeling techniques to generate continuous, yearly estimates of civilian control for all countries from 1946 to 2010.  I incorporate the presence of norms through a dynamic modeling structure and find that doing so significantly improves model performance, supporting my theoretical expectations.

**Jiyoung Ko – Dissertation Abstract**

**A Prelude to Violence? The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate Violence**

Nationalism has long been cited by political scientists as a culprit of violence between states. My dissertation advances a new theoretical framework that uniquely combines two levels of analysis—namely, the individual and state levels—to elucidate the effect of popular nationalism on the initiation of international conflict. International relations scholars have either dismissed nationalism as epiphenomenal or have assumed that it increases the likelihood of interstate violence. Contrary to these conventional views, I claim that popular nationalism has a stabilizing effect and does not always lead to conflict. Popular nationalism can have diverse effects, as it induces two distinct foreign policy preferences at the individual level: nationalistic sentiments make individuals prefer not only hawkish foreign policy means but also complete success as a foreign policy outcome. A nationalistic public’s demand for complete success prevents leaders from hastily jumping into international conflict in the face of rising nationalism, for it dramatically increases the domestic costs of a failed conflict and the likelihood of paying such costs. Consequently, a conflict-inducing effect of nationalism appears only when leaders have firm belief in the likelihood of complete success or are politically vulnerable but lack repressive tools to deal with the uprising of popular nationalism, in which case they are forced to initiate a losing conflict. By combining evidence from survey and lab experiments with in-depth case studies on territorial disputes between China and Japan, and between Argentina and the United Kingdom, I found that the rise of popular nationalism has led mainly to the status quo and only rarely to conflict.

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**Carrie Lee – Dissertation Abstract**

**The Politics of Military Operations**

Do domestic political institutions affect the way that states fight wars, and if so, why? I argue that military operations on the battlefield are systematically influenced by civilian politicians to favor lower-risk strategies in the months preceding a domestic election. Because domestic constituencies are casualty-sensitive, democratically elected civilians face strong incentives to temporarily trade long-term strategic success for a short-term decrease in casualties, resulting in the direct and indirect politicization of military operations. Direct politicization occurs when civilians intervene in operations through direct requests, increasing monitoring, or changing tactical guidelines, while operations are indirectly politicized when the military polices its own behavior in response to organizational, bureaucratic, or personal incentives . This culminates in a preference for defensive operations in the months leading up to a domestic election, while high-risk offensive strategies are delayed until after electoral pressures have been resolved. The first empirical chapter uses the insights developed in my theory to systematically test the effect of electoral cycles on troop movement and violence levels during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I then use both most different and most similar case designs to qualitatively evaluate the timing of military operations during the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. The third empirical chapter evaluates systematic deviations and patterns in bombing operations over North and South Vietnam using a recently released dataset that enables analysis of bombing runs from 1965 to 1975. Finally, I conclude with a comparative case study of the strategic bombing campaigns as executed by the United States and United Kingdom during World War II. In each case, I show that domestic politics profoundly influence civilian decision-making during conflict, and that this influence is most pronounced in the months immediately preceding an election. These findings challenge our current understanding of battlefield effectiveness, normal civil-military relations, and how democracies fight wars more generally.

**Simon Miles – Dissertation Abstract**

**Engaging the ‘Evil Empire’: East – West Relations in the Second Cold War**

In Cold War history, the first half of the 1980s, a five-year span during which Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev all held power, is frequently overlooked by scholars who jump from détente’s demise with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the storied Reagan-Gorbachev relationship after 1985. The intervening period is generally seen as one marked by Soviet instability and increasing global tensions — a “Second Cold War” more dangerous than any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Based on extensive archival research in Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, demonstrate that this characterization is incomplete: Ronald Reagan’s desire to stabilize US-Soviet relations in fact predated his election in 1980. He consistently took unpublicized steps to that end beginning shortly after his inauguration, an approach which the Kremlin reciprocated. This back-channel engagement with Moscow did not become overt until early 1984, however, when Reagan was sufficiently confident in the United States’ relative military and economic power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union to make these efforts public. This project expands our understanding of the Reagan presidency, the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War using new international evidence; and it offers insight into the roots of cooperation between adversarial states.